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In spite of the challenge posed by globalization and the proliferation of 
“non-traditional security threats,” the concept of security continues to be 
understood in realist terms as “national security”. The “national security” 
doctrine, which conflates “state” and “nation” regarding them as coterminous, 
makes the state responsible for the protection of the population which it controls 
(often by force alone) from external threats. The state is both the referent object 
(i.e. the end which is to be secured) and the only legitimate means of 
“protection.” As Sadako Ogata, co-chair of the CHS points out, “[t]raditionally, 
security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. Security issues 
were therefore examined in the context of “state security,” i.e. the protection of 
the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and values from external attack” 
(Ogata in Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 5).
Japanese foreign policy remains, despite the commitment of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
to promoting “human security,” deeply wedded to the “national security 
doctrine.” This has particularly been the case since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
returned to power in landslide election victory in the Lower House last year. 
Japanese foreign policy under Abe has notably been more assertive with more 
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6emphasis placed on defending Japan’s national interest and territorial integrity at 
the risk of antagonizing Japan’s neighbors and regional trading partners. The 
cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy remains the Japan-US security alliance 
whereby the United States provides “security” from external threat by stationing 
its own troops on Japanese soil. Critics have considered the security alliance to 
qualify Japan’s status as a sovereign state. For Gavan McCormack, Japan 
remains a “client state” of the US; Japan enjoys the formal trappings of 
sovereignty but has internalized the requirement to prioritize the interests of the 
US in international relations as was noticeable in Japan’s support for the 
invasion of Iraq despite its questionable legality and considerable domestic 
opposition (McCormack, 2007). Despite strong support for the US-Security 
alliance, Abe has made no secret of his desire to re-arm Japan thereby 
“normalizing” Japan’s standing in international society as a fully “sovereign” 
state and regional power. In order to do so, he will need to revise Article 9 of the 
constitution under which Japan forever “renounces war as a sovereign right of 
the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes.” (The Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 1947/2013). 
This article will attempt to account for how war became “a sovereign right 
of the nation” in the first place by examining the origins of the national security 
doctrine in early modern Europe. It will be argued that its evolution is 
unintelligible without reference to the “wars of religion” (or more appropriately, 
intra-religious wars) of the seventeenth century and that the modern nation-state, 
which Thomas Hobbes introduced as a “Mortall God” in his classic Leviathan 
(1651/1985) is, in Carl Schmitt’s term “a secularized theological concept” 
(Schmitt, 1922/1985). Next, the concept of Human Security which may be seen 
as an attempt to “broaden and deepen” security by making the individual and not 
the state the main referent object of security discourse will be introduced. 
Threats to individual security are seen to arise not only from external threats 
(that is threats from other states) as traditionally characterized by war and 
conflict but also internally from the violent actions of the state itself as well as 
by structures of violence and oppression which inhibit the realization of human 
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dignity and freedom. Both “narrow” and “broad” approaches will be examined 
before it will be argued, following Michel Foucault, that human security can 
best be understood as a form of racialized “biopolitics.” An attempt will be made 
to illustrate the argument with reference to Japan after the events of March 11, 
2011 (hereafter 3.11). Finally, it will be argued that an explicit commitment to 
protecting and empowering all residents of Japan after 3.11 may serve the 
national interest better than a narrow obsession with territorial disputes and the 
renewal of the “blood alliance” between North Korea and “Imperial China” 
(Ikegami, 2012). 
I. “The Mortal God”: The National Security Doctrine
Conventional approaches to security studies remain anchored in a realist 
world view based on following assumptions. First, the state is viewed as both 
the key actor in the theory and practice of international relations and as the 
legitimate representative of the collective will of the nation. In the theatre of 
International Relations (IR), “states set the scene in which they, along with non-
state actors stage their dramas” (Waltz, 1986, p. 89). Second, the primary 
responsibility of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state in an 
anarchic international system characterized by the absence of a common power. 
The absence of a common power affords IR a structure which helps explain the 
persistence not only of separate territorially bounded units of international 
political activity but also conflict between these units. This structure is 
considered immutable having endured since either the Peace of Westphalia or 
the days of the Peloponnesian War. Conflict is, consequently, seen as inevitable 
and endemic to international relations with military action considered a 
legitimate instrument of state policy. Third, “national security” may occasionally 
necessitate the suspension of normal constitutional arrangements and the 
suspension of civil liberties including Habeas Corpus, particularly for those 
groups and individuals deemed to constitute a threat to the “national interest.” 
This is akin to what Schmitt terms a “state of exception:” a situation of 
“extreme peril” and “danger to the existence of the state” which requires the 
8application of extraordinary measures (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 6). Threats to the 
“national interest” are seen as threats to the state’s boundaries, institutions, 
subjects and values from outside, even if these threats come from within the 
state’s borders (Shani, 2007, pp. 1-2). It is the sovereign who decides “whether 
there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it” 
(Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 7). Thus, the sovereign is “he who decides on the 
exception” (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 5). Schmitt based his understanding of the 
“sovereign” on the founding father of the “realist tradition:” Thomas Hobbes.
Central to Hobbes’s thought is a view of the sovereign as a Leviathan, a 
secularized “Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace 
and defense” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 227). This “Mortall God” alone is capable 
of bestowing protection on his subjects in return for their liberty. The Leviathan 
uses the strength of all others who have surrendered their power to Him in the 
first place to bring into being “a condition in which the right of each man to self-
preservation could be realized” (Hobbes 1651/1985, p. 222). Without “a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition which is called 
war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man” (Hobbes 1651/1985, 
p. 185). There can be no rule of law in this state of “anarchy” because “law 
depends for its existence upon a “common power”’ (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 185) 
absent in the “state of nature” and, for realists, in contemporary IR. 
Consequently, there can be no consideration of ethics or justice. As Hobbes 
succinctly put it:
To this war of every man against every man this is also consequent; that 
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice or injustice, 
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no Law; 
where no law, no injustice. (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 188)
By effectively removing considerations of justice as criteria for political 
obligation, Hobbes was responding to contemporary Protestant challenges to 
earthly power and authority which denied Papal authority on the grounds that 
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God could not be represented by a human being but could only be known 
through Scripture. “Just as for the Protestant reformists there was no available 
presence of the authorizing deity, so too for Hobbes there was no available 
presence of the authorizing creator(s) of the commonwealth” (Orford, 2011, p. 
115). The Leviathan itself is taken from The Book of Job (Chapters 40-41) 
where it is depicted as “the strongest and most tremendous sea monster” 
(Schmitt, 1938/2008, p. 6). However, the Leviathan itself is transformed in 
Hobbes’s imagination and, instead of a biblical sea dragon, we find a giant, 
crowned figure representing a sovereign made up of hundreds of individual 
citizens. The fact that he is clutching both a sword and a crosier, symbols of both 
“temporal” and “spiritual” power, makes the “political theology” (Schmitt, 
1922/1985) of the Leviathan transparent. Seen from the frontispiece, Hobbes’ 
Leviathan “is a fearful dominus, the earthly version of an extreme nominalist 
God” (Elshtain, 2008, p.105). Man can only find “security” in their submission 
to this dominus, a “multitude of men…made one person” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, 
p. 220). The Leviathan in turn establishes the conditions whereby Man can enjoy 
his “liberty” for “in the act of our submission, consisteth both our obligation, 
and our liberty” (Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 144). “Security” and “liberty” are thus 
not only interdependent but inextricably linked to the establishment of the state 
which alone, like a “Mortall God,” is capable of bestowing protection on its 
subjects. 
II. “Putting a Hook in the Nose of the Leviathan”: From National to 
Human Security
“In the eighteenth century”, Schmitt claimed “the leviathan as magnus 
homo, as the godlike sovereign person of the state, was destroyed from within.” 
It was “destroyed” not only by the French and American revolutions, but also by 
the emergence of the liberal differentiation between “public” and “private” 
spheres. In Hobbes’s worldview, freedom of religion, thought and conscience 
were unnecessary and deeply divisive impediments to the consolidation of 
sovereign power. There could be no “private” sphere if the leviathan was to 
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guarantee public security.  For Schmitt, the “distinction between inner and outer 
became for the mortal god a sickness unto death.” However, “his work, the state, 
survived him in the form of a well-organized executive, army, police as well as a 
well-working professionally trained bureaucracy.” The state became to an 
increasing extent, “perceived as a mechanism and a machine.” As that perception 
grew, “so did the development of the concepts of right and law.” Once the 
absolutist state of sovereign princes became bound by law and transformed from 
a police “into a ‘constitutional stateʼ …law, too, changed and became a technical 
means to ‘put a hook in the nose’ of the Leviathan” (Schmitt, 1938/ 2008, p. 65).
Just as law “put a hook in the nose” of the Leviathan, it is suggested here 
that the concept of human security seeks to do the same with the national 
security doctrine. However, the Leviathan, unlike in Schmitt’s domestic analogy, 
has so far managed to wriggle free. Consequently, human security remains 
dependent on an understanding of security which continues to assign primacy to 
the state as the main agent of protection and empowerment for individuals. 
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan guaranteed rights through a framework of law. 
Obedience to the Leviathan would be binding since its origins lie in a mythical 
social contract between governors and the governed. The alternative to the order 
of the Leviathan was “anarchy:” a war of “everyman against everyman” 
(Hobbes, 1651/1985, p. 185). John Locke had argued that it would be irrational 
of men as citizens to surrender their natural rights to “life, liberty and estate” 
unless they received guarantees from the state. For John Locke, there was a 
natural right to life, liberty and property since God’s natural law stipulated that 
“no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 
1689/1967).Thus, legal rights were substituted for natural rights. In order to 
ensure that the state fulfilled its contractual obligations to those it governed, the 
state’s power was limited by a constitution which guaranteed a separation of 
powers and, much later, representative democracy. Herein lies the problem of 
“human security:” how to protect and guarantee the rights of the individual from 
the very agent of protection, the sovereign state.
The notion of human security is premised on the assumption that the 
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individual human being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. 
Consequently, the claims of all other referents, including the nation-state, derive 
from the sovereignty of the individual (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, p. 2). 
While most advocates of human security agree that its primary goal should be 
the protection of individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual 
should be protected from. Although multiple dimensions and conceptions of 
human security have been identified, conventionally a distinction, or rather an 
antinomy, is made between “narrow” and “broad” definitions.
Broadly-speaking, this distinction corresponds to Sir Isaiah Berlin’s 
differentiation between “negative” and “positive” freedom. “Negative freedom,” 
for Berlin, denoted freedom from coercion whereas “positive freedom” was the 
freedom to act in a certain way. The first approach to human security conceives 
of human security “negatively,” in terms of the absence of threats to the physical 
security or safety of individuals. This “narrow” definition has been adopted by 
the pre-Harper Canadian government and is exemplified in the publication of the 
Human Security Report by the Human Security Centre based at the Liu Institute 
for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia which defines human 
security as the protection of individuals from “violent threats” (Human Security 
Report, 2005). The “Canadian” approach has been institutionalized through the 
formation of the Human Security Network (HSN), a group of mainly western 
states led by Canada which meet informally at ministerial level to discuss issues 
pertaining to human security. Aside from providing methodological clarity, the 
“narrow definition” of human security has the advantage of being anchored in 
the western liberal tradition of rights-based political theory. The individual is 
viewed as “unencumbered” (Hopgood, 2000), abstracted from the social and 
cultural mores of his or her community, and invested with formal political 
equality. All individuals are seen as possessing inalienable and fundamental 
rights to “life, liberty and property” by virtue of their common humanity. These 
rights are enshrined in the United Nations Charter 9 and, in particular, the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR). This rights-based 
approach seeks to strengthen these international normative legal frameworks 
12
while also deepening regional and national commitments to human rights 
legislation. International institutions are invested with the responsibility of 
developing and coordinating regional and national human rights norms with a 
view to bringing about their convergence. 
The “narrow approach” also informs the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP) which, following its adoption by the General Assembly after the 
World Summit in 2005(2), has recently been institutionalized by United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1970 and 1971 authorizing the creation of 
a “no-fly zone” over Libya in 2011. Paragraph 138 of the World Summit 
Outcome resolution stated that each “individual State has the responsibility to 
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.” “This responsibility,” the resolution continues, “entails the 
prevention of such crimes” (emphasis mine). Where states, such as Libya in 
2011 or Syria at the time of writing, fail in their responsibility to protect the 
population under its legal authority, then the “international community” under 
paragraph 139, must assume that responsibility and, if attempts “to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” through the 
United Nations to prevent “crimes against humanity” are not successful, must be 
prepared to “take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2005). Libya in February 2011 was reminded of its “responsibility to 
protect its population” through United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 
(United Nations Security Council, 2011a), before resolution 1973, less than a 
month later, established a “ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya in order to protect civilians” (UNSC, 2011b). The establishment of a 
“no-fly zone” enforced by the considerable airpower of NATO led to the 
eventual toppling of the Libyan regime of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi under 
the weight of NATO bombing which was itself of questionable legality (Booth, 
The World Summit was held at UN Headquarters in New York between 14 and 16 September 
2005 to discuss the progress of the Millennium Development Goals. The Outcome was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly (A/Res/60/1).
(2)
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2011).
Whilst the advocates of the narrow approach prefer to ground human 
security in terms of “negative liberty” (Berlin, 1969), the resolution adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012 goes beyond a narrow 
focus on the responsibility of states to protect their citizens and appears to 
repudiate the use of force as a means of protecting the individual from “violent 
threats.” Responding to calls to come up with a working definition of human 
security as contained in the paragraph 143 of the World Summit Outcome 
document which committed the United Nations to “discussing and defining the 
notion of human security in the General Assembly”, the resolution posited a 
common understanding of “human security” based on “the right of people to live 
in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.” “All individuals,” 
according to the resolution, “are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from 
want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their 
human potential.” Furthermore, human security “does not entail the threat or the 
use of force or coercive measures” nor seek to “replace State security” (UN 
General Assembly, 2012).
In part, the wording of the General Assembly Resolution reflects the 
conclusions of the Final Report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), 
headed by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, which put forward a “broader” 
conceptions of human security which takes into account “freedom from want, 
freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” 
(Commission on Human Security, 2003). At the heart of the CHS approach, is a 
“positive” definition of human security as encompassing the “vital core” of all 
human lives: a set of “elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy” and 
consider to be “vital” to their wellbeing. The objective of human security is, 
thus, to protect “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfillment” (CHS, 2003). Although this “vital core,” based 
largely on the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen, is not specified, 
its protection “in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment” 
(CHS, 2003, p. 4) is seen as the principal objective of human security. Elements 
14
of the “vital core” include “fundamental human rights” pertaining to “survival, 
to livelihood, and to basic dignity” (Alkire, 2003, p. 24). As Sabine Alkire, the 
Report’s main architect, notes in a working paper, human security is 
“deliberately protective” in that “it recognizes that people and communities are 
fatally threatened by events well beyond their control” (Alkire, 2003, p. 2). 
Shielding people from danger requires concerted international effort to develop 
norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities, 
including those arising from extreme poverty, ill heath, and the effects of 
environmental degradation (CHS 2003, p. 6). However, protection alone is seen 
as insufficient to combat human insecurity: human security seeks also to “to 
empower them to act on their own behalf” (CHS 2003, p. 2 - italics mine). 
Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full 
participants in decision-making (CHS, 2003). Protection and empowerment are 
regarded as mutually reinforcing and needed to achieve greater human security 
for all.
III. Human Security as Biopolitics: Reflections on Japan Post 3.11
It is argued here that human security as understood from a broad perspective 
may be viewed as a form of “biopolitics” (Berman, 2007; Duffield, 2007; 
Grayson, 2008; De Larrianga and Doucet, 2008; Shani, 2011) in contrast with 
the “sovereign power” of the sovereign state as exemplified by the national 
security paradigm. However, the “responsibility to protect” clearly demonstrates 
that the biopolitical project of Human Security rests on the firm foundations of 
the sovereign power of the state and “international community” (Foucault, 2003; 
Agamben, 1998). Whereas “sovereign power” refers to a sovereign’s right to 
“take life or let live” and is exercised over territories, biopolitics marks a new 
power: “to “make” live and “let” die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 241). Defined as “the 
set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human 
species become the object of a political strategy,” the origins of biopower or 
biopolitics, go back to the attempt, starting in Europe in the eighteenth century, 
“to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena 
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characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, 
birth rate, life expectancy, race” (Foucault, 2008, p. 1). The origins of this new 
type of power lie in none other than the pastoral individualizing power of the 
Christian ecclesiastical pastorate (Foucault, 2007, p. 364).
“Race,” understood as “ethnicized” difference is central to the exercise of 
biopolitics. For Foucault, racism introduced “a break into the domain of life 
which is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what 
must die…a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population 
that appears to be a biological domain” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Thus, racism 
enables a distinction to be made between those whom are “made to live” and 
those who “must die.” It is above all a “technology permitting the exercise of 
biopower” whose function is “to regulate the distribution of death and make 
possible the murderous functions of the state” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 19). Race, 
therefore, intimately and inextricably binds biopolitics to necropolitics 
(Mbembe, 2001).
It is argued here that human security is a racialized discourse permitting a 
distinction to be drawn between those who are “made to live” and “those who 
must die” (Duffield, 2007; Shani, 2012). Both “narrow” and “broad” approaches 
are complicit in reinforcing this distinction. The narrow approach reinforces the 
“sovereign” power of the state over “its” population through the “responsibility 
to protect.” In so doing, it re-legitimizes the post-colonial state which in many 
societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, may be the source of 
insecurity in the first place. Where the state is unable to adequately discharge the 
responsibility to protect “its” population, the burden falls on the “international 
community” through an “adequate and timely” response which, in the case of 
Libya, took the form of armed intervention (although at a distance) by western 
powers with neo-colonial overtones. Seen from a post-colonial (or Southern) 
perspective, “RtoP” makes sovereignty, which in many cases was achieved as a 
result of an often bloody struggle for independence, conditional on maintaining 
the “standards of civilization” of former colonial powers. An “adequate and 
timely response,” therefore, is merely another incarnation of the “White Man’s 
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Burden” given the propensity of NATO to intervene in the “name of the 
international community.”
The “shadow” of “race” which, as Mbembe (2003, p. 17) argues, has been 
“ever present in Western political thought and practice,” is also discernible in the 
“broad approach” to Human Security which, although it eschews violent means, 
inextricably links development to security. The “development-security nexus” 
(Duffield, 2007, Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012) has been critiqued for making 
“security” dependent upon “development.” “Development” ceases to be a choice 
which post-colonial societies may make but becomes a pre-requisite for their 
entry into the “international community” since the security of those members of 
those “developed” members of the international community depends upon the 
development of those designated as “underdeveloped.” 
Seen through a racialized biopolitical lens, Japan’s commitment to human 
security is significant in two respects. Internationally, it helps to define Japan’s 
role in international society within the confines of Article 9 through a 
commitment to international development. Human security was identified as a 
basic policy framework in the 2003 revision of the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) Charter and as Makoto Sato notes the referents of Human 
Security are understood as people living in developing countries (Sato, 2007, p. 
90). Japan, furthermore, played a key role in the establishment, and is the main 
donor, of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. Domestically, it 
“interpellates” (Althusser, 1971) the Japanese people as members of a 
“developed” nation whose security needs—both from fear and from want—are 
fulfilled by the “mortal God” of the state. 
The racialized divisions between “inside” and “outside” are maintained by a 
strong ethnic component to Japanese nationalism. Despite moves from the 
Japanese state to promote the internationalization of Japanese society through a 
discourse of multiculturalism (tabunkashugi), the modern Japanese state, dating 
from the Meiji restoration of 1868, is widely seen as having been built upon pre-
existing ethnic origins: bounded by a common territory, language, religion and 
myths of common ancestry (Lehmann, 1982). Japanese identity is, therefore, 
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considered an ethnic identity, the ethnic bonds which unite the Japanese people 
or “minzoku” seen as “real” (A.D. Smith, 1999) rather than “invented” (Gellner, 
1964) or “imagined” (Anderson, 1991). In recent years, this “primordial” view 
of Japanese identity has been challenged by modernists and scholars of Japanese 
“cultural nationalism.” For these scholars, contemporary Japan is constituted 
through discourses on the Japanese “nihonjinron” and is therefore “imagined” 
(Yoshino, 1992). If Japan is “imagined,” then it follows that it can as easily be 
imagined as a multiethnic society as an ethnically homogenous one (Lie, 2001). 
The prevalent “internal Others” which permit the Japanese nation-state to define 
itself are the zainichi and nikkeijin (Weiner, 1997), although they have been 
joined during the years of the “bubble” with “newcomers” from China, the 
Philippines and other areas of South and South-East Asia (Lie, 2001). The 
Japanese state now recognizes these new immigrant groups through a discourse 
of tabunka kyousei (literally “multicultural symbiosis”) but in the process reifies 
and homogenizes ethnic identities, preserving the category of “the Japanese” 
despite its great internal diversity. 
3.11 shattered the binary opposition between “inside” and “outside” upon 
which the Japanese state based its commitment to human security. With the state 
unable to protect its own citizens from the triple disasters of 3.11, people in the 
Tohoku area were forced to evacuate their homes and communities as their 
security was sacrificed to protect those living in the Tokyo metropolitan area. 
Biopolitical divisions became inscribed within the Japanese nation. Ganbaro 
Nippon was an empty slogan when so much of the Tohoku area was in urgent 
need of reconstruction and assistance. In Fukushima alone, approximately 
64,000 people were displaced by the disaster (IMC, 2011) and the total cost of 
3.11 was estimated at 3 trillion yen, not including personal damage 
(Reconstruction Bureau, 2013).   
The Fukushima nuclear  cr is is ,  fur thermore,  demonstrated the 
“powerlessness” of the state to protect its citizens in a globalizing world where 
the dominant economic actors are corporations. The Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO), according to the official report into the nuclear accident, 
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“strongly influenced energy policy and nuclear regulations while abdicating their 
own responsibilities and letting METI take the responsibility on the frontline” 
(The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 44). The Report described the “regulatory 
capture” of Japan’s nuclear industry, in which oversight by regulators effectively 
ceases, tracing this back to the establishment of the Federation of Electric Power 
Companies (FEPC), an unregulated lobbying association of electric power 
companies which is accused of influencing government policy on nuclear power. 
FEPC “prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety,” 
and, in effectively deciding that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations 
would not be stopped in any circumstances, effectively compromised the 
security of the general public. 
Specifically, the Report assigned primary responsibility for the accident to 
the government, regulators and TEPCO, accusing them collectively of betraying 
“the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents.” However, for the Chair of 
the official report into the disaster, the “fundamental causes” were to be found in 
the “ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our 
reluctance to question authority; our devotion to “sticking with the program;” 
our groupism; and our insularity” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012, p. 9). The 
implications for Japanese national identity are clear for all to see. 
IV. Conclusion
Just as the detonation of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and defeat in the 
Second World War proved to be the catalysts for the unraveling of the old 
imperial order based on militarism and unconditional obedience to the Emperor, 
Fukushima will necessitate a rethinking of what it is to be Japanese; of who is to 
be included in a nation of many different regional and ethnic identities, and of 
who is to be excluded. Japan emerged from the ashes of the Second World War 
as a modern, democratic, affluent and peaceful society but it continued to be 
imagined as a homogenous, ethnic community. Colonial minorities such as the 
Korean and Chinese zainichi were excluded from the post-war Japanese “nation” 
at its very inception and the Japanese state has come to view the People’s 
19
From National to Human Security?
Reflections on Post 3.11 Japan
Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as Japan’s 
natural “enemies” and a source of external threats (Ikegami, 2012). 3.11 
exploded this myth by laying bear the biopolitical divisions upon which the 
modern Japanese state was based. Faith in the “Mortal God” of the state was 
badly shaken by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident as many Japanese 
nationals were forced to leave their homes and were effectively abandoned by 
the state. Only a commitment to protecting the human security of all of Japan’s 
residents—from tsunami-hit and irradiated rural communities in the North-East 
to migrant workers employed on irregular contracts in the informal sector in 
urban areas—can, it is argued, form the basis of a new national ethic capable of 
rising to the challenges of a rapidly globalizing and increasingly complex and 
uncertain world.
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<Summary>
Giorgio Shani
This article will attempt to provide a genealogy of security by examining the 
transition from national to human security with reference to contemporary Japan 
after the tragic events of March 11, 2011. It will be argued that the national 
security doctrine, based on the assumptions that the state is the main referent 
of security and is responsible for the protection of its citizens, continues to be 
hegemonic in both the theory and practice of international relations. This will 
be discussed with reference to Hobbes’s classic defence of sovereignty in the 
Leviathan (1651). However, in recent years, it has been seen as unable to deal 
with the plethora of challenges associated with globalization; global climate 
change, international economic crises, transnational terrorism and crime, nuclear 
proliferation, all challenge the capabilities of states individually and collectively 
to provide security for their citizens. Consequently, attempts have been made 
to “broaden and deepen” security by re-conceptualizing security as “human 
security”. Both “narrow” and “broad” approaches to human security will be then 
introduced before it will be argued that human security may be seen as a form 
of “biopolitics” (Foucault, 2003, 2007, 2008). An attempt will then be made to 
illustrate the argument with reference to Japan. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Japan International Cooperation Agency have both incorporated 
“human security” into Japan’s Foreign Policy to differing degrees, the Japanese 
state remains wedded to the national security doctrine and has been reluctant 
to make human security a domestic priority after 3.11. In conclusion, it will be 
24
argued that an explicit commitment to protecting and empowering all residents 
of Japan will better serve Japan’s ‘national interest’ rather than a narrow focus 
on defending territorial claims against her neighbours and regional trading 
partners.
